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Abstract
This paper shows that when being perceived as a good manager is a necessary condition to
be promoted, a priori talented managers may undertake excessively risky projects. Indeed, such a
choice renders more difﬁcult the updating of beliefs process regarding their actual types. In turn,
good managers are induced to lower the level of effort they perform since the extent to which effort
impacts the perception the market has about their talent is lessened. This adversely impacts the
ﬁrms’ proﬁts. Hence, career concerns do not discipline good managers in our context. However,
we show how employers can limit managerial slack by increasing monitoring.
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1I. INTRODUCTION
The perspective of being promoted in the future doubtlessly impacts the current behavior of a man-
ager. The present paper focuses on a negative effect this perspective can have on her performance.
More speciﬁcally, we argue that managers who have a good reputation on the labor market are induced
to choose risky projects to keep this reputation. This in turn leads them to perform suboptimal levels of
effort and decreases the total value of the ﬁrms they work in. Hence, the career concerns we consider
here do not discipline good managers. We emphasize this dark side of promotions and investigate how
monitoring can help the employers alleviate the problem.
As the promotions we consider are equivalent to a substantial increase in revenue, the framework
we adopt here allows for many contexts: The R&D engineer who wants to get a promotion or create
her own ﬁrm, the general partner with a venture capital fund who desires to attract investors to set up
another fund at better conditions, or the divisional manager who wants to ﬁnance a project that will
signiﬁcantly increase her revenue. And we study the reaction of the party (respectively the hierarchy,
the current limited partners, the headquarters) who is penalized because the current behavior implies
too much risk and too low effort.
Managers do not have access to high-level positions at the beginning of their careers since they
often lack the experience to hold these positions efﬁciently. To capture this in the simplest way, we
consider a two-period model where all managers work within a company during the ﬁrst period while
only managers who have a good reputation are promoted in the second period.
Reputation on the labor market is principally grounded on the manager’s past activities. Hence,
there exists a high level of uncertainty regarding these abilities when managers begin their professional
lives as neither themselves nor their employers know whether they are ﬁt for the positions they hold
2or desire to hold. Thus, we assume that at the beginning of the ﬁrst period (today) information is
symmetric but incomplete about the managers’ skills: The market (and the managers) forms a priori
beliefs regarding their talents, taking into account their diplomas for example. We assume that there
exists two types of managers: “Good” ones and “bad” ones.
However, as managers go on with their careers, both the market and themselves come to learn
information regarding their competencies. Thus, a priori beliefs are updated with respect to available
information. Accounting proﬁts and a public report on the manager’s activity represent two sources of
hardinformation. Naturally, managerswill exert effort inan attempt toinﬂuencepositively the market’s
beliefs. To phrase it differently, managers have career concerns. Indeed, according to DeMarzo and
Dufﬁe [1995], “Career concerns arise whenever the (internal or external) labor market uses a worker’s
current output to update the beliefs about the worker’s ability and then bases future wages on these
updatedbeliefs”. Asintraditionalmodelsofcareerconcerns, thelabormarketanticipates theses actions
in equilibrium and draws the correct inference about ability from the observed output.
The two sources of information we consider differ along two dimensions. First of all, managers can
manipulate the accuracy of the information content of the proﬁts by choosing to undertake a more or
less risky project, whereas they cannot inﬂuence the variance of the information contained in the report.
Managers may favor risk since a very risky project makes it difﬁcult to infer from its outcome whether
success is due to fortune or managerial talent, and whether failure occurs because of bad luck or a lack
of managerial skills. We assume the project risk-proﬁle to be observable but not veriﬁable: Company
owners observe the choices managers make but are unable to write contracts contingent on this soft
information. Next, company owners have the opportunity to choose the accuracy of the information
content of the report. For example, they hire a supervisor to monitor the manager. This allows them to
elicit information regarding the managers’ talent and facilitates the updating of beliefs process regard-
3ing the managers’ abilities. Conversely, they cannot impact the accuracy of the information content of
the proﬁts.
We analyze how the perspective of being promoted in the future inﬂuences the current willingness
of managers to let the market (and themselves) learn information regarding their characteristics as well
as their employers’ willingness to gather this information. It seems reasonable that a condition for
managers to be promoted is that the updated beliefs regarding their types are good enough, that is, they
need to be perceived as good managers at the end of the ﬁrst period. In this context, we identify two
opposite behaviors depending on the initial reputation of the managers. On the one hand, a priori bad
managers want the market to change its beliefs regarding their types. Hence, we show that, provided
that the additional revenue associated with the promotion is attractive enough, they choose theless risky
project to facilitate the updating of beliefs process. On the other hand, a priori good managers want the
market to keep itsa priori abouttheirtalents. Therefore, they are likely to optfor theriskierprojectso as
to limit the updating process. This induces them to reduce their levels of effort since the extent to which
effort impacts the perception the market has about their talent is lessened. This negatively impacts the
total value of the ﬁrm they work in. However, employers can partially prevent such behaviors. They
monitor the managers which improves the accuracy of information regarding actual managerial talent
and incentivizes managers to exert a higher level of effort than they would otherwise perform. We show
that employers monitor more managers of the a priori good type than managers of the a priori bad type.
To sum up brieﬂy these results, employers complement one source of manipulable- by the manager -
information (accounting proﬁts) with a non-manipulable one (the report they receive).
The present research builds on the career concerns literature. The starting point of this literature is
that managers are disciplined directly through the labor market: Superior performances generate high
wage offers whereas poor performances generate low wage offers. In such a context, Fama [1980] de-
4veloped the idea that explicit incentives are not necessary. This suggestion is only correct under narrow
assumptions (neutrality with respect to risk and no discounting rate) [Holmström, 1982, 1999]. Never-
theless, if managers have time preferences, Fama’s conclusion does not hold. However, career concerns
still create important incentives, even in the presence of explicit incentive contracts [Gibbons and Mur-
phy, 1992]. Thus, an optimal compensation contract optimizes total incentives, that is, the combination
of the implicit incentives from career concerns and the explicit incentives from compensation contracts.
In this paper, we have chosen not to tackle the explicit incentives issue. We do not mean to suggest that
such incentives are irrelevant: Employers actually use them in formal compensation contracts [Murphy,
1998, Gibbons and Murphy, 1992]. However, some constraints limit their utilization so that the explicit
incentives facing CEOs in large ﬁrms are overall weak [Jensen and Murphy, 1990]. Hence, implicit
incentives play a critical role and we focus on this speciﬁcr o l eh e r e .
In some occasions, managers have private information regarding their abilities. This is captured in
Zwiebel [1995], Breeden and Viswanathan [1998], or Prendengast and Stole [1996]1. We examine the
opposite case where managers and the labor market share the same information, which makes sense
when managers are at the early stages of their career or when they want to switch for another job
requiring different talents. Considering a situation where information is symmetric (as in Holmström
[1982, 1999]) and where there exists several types of managers, allows us to derive different behaviors
depending on whether managers are a priori good or bad.
The choice of risk policy by risk-averse managers has been studied in the career concerns literature
[Holmström, 1982, 1999, DeMarzo and Dufﬁe, 19952, Hermalin, 1993]. In a context where managers
are concerned by a promotion, we argue that risk is a relevant element to be taken into account even if
managers are risk-neutral.
1See also Diamond [1989] in another context.
5Managers try to inﬂuence the perception the market has regarding their ability by manipulating the
learning process. Either they exert effort to inﬂate their output [Holmström, 1982, 1999] or they modify
the accuracy of the information that accrues to the market by choosing the risk of the project they
undertake [Holmström, 1982, 1999, Hermalin, 1993], or by resorting to hedging technics [DeMarzo
and Dufﬁe, 19953, Breeden and Viswanathan, 1998]. What is new in the present paper is that we
examine the impact of the risk-taking policy on the level of effort exerted.
Moreover, we investigate how monitoring help company owners improve the accuracy of informa-
tion regarding actual managerial talent, which in turns restores incentives to work.
The paper is organized as follows. Section II introduces the model and discusses the most important
assumptions. InSectionIII,weassumethataccountingproﬁts aretheonly sourceofinformation. Then,
we derive the optimal behaviors of both kinds of managers for both periods regarding their choices of
level of effort and their choices of risk. Section IV examines these choices when employers can resort
to monitoring. It also discusses the relation of the paper with the existing literature and proposes
implications. Concluding remarks follow. Proofs are supplied to the Appendix.
II. THE MODEL
We consider a two-period model with a competitive labor market. There exists a continuum ofﬁrms
(also referred to as company owners or employers) and a continuum of managers (also referred to as
employees). During the ﬁrst period, all managers are at the same level in the hierarchy . In the second
period managers perceived as good are promoted. All parties are risk-neutral.
II.A. First Period
6A ﬁrm’s gross accounting proﬁt π1 is given by
(1) π1(θ,rpi,e)=θ + rpi + e,
where θ represents the manager’s talent, rpi is the project’s risk and e is the manager’s effort. The
manager’s talent is unknown both to her and to her employers. However, it is common knowledge
that θ is drawn from the distribution θ ∼ N(Eθ;σ2
θ). Thus, information is incomplete but symmetric.
Either Eθ = E
g




are of the “bad” type. Managers must choose between two projects that exhibit different risk-proﬁles.
Both projects are risky and project pA deﬁned by rpA ∼ N(0;σ2
pA) is less risky than project pB deﬁned
by rpB ∼ N(0;σ2
pB): σ2
pB >σ 2
pA. Furthermore, we assume pB to be risky enough and pA to exhibit
as u f ﬁciently low level of risk. The choice of project is observable but not veriﬁable. As Hermalin
[1993] suggests, this assumption makes sense: Stock analysts are to evaluate project risks; board of
directors often have the expertise to do so; even the business press sometimes assesses the risk of new
projects4. This implies that no contract can be contingent on the choice of project5. Once the manager
has decided which project to undertake, she exerts an unobservable level of effort e. This effort costs
her ψ(e),w i t hψ0 > 0, ψ00 > 0 and ψ000(e) > 0.
Company owners have access to a monitoring technology (e.g. hire a supervisor or an auditor).
They choose the precision of the report τ, once the manager has chosen the project pi, but before she
exerts the effort e.L e t  (with   ∼ N(0;σ2
 )) represent an observation error. Setting up a monitoring
technology that costs c(σ2
 ) (with c0 < 0, c00 > 0, c000 < 0, c(∞)=0 , c0(0) = −∞ and c0(∞)=0 )
allows company owners to choose the monitoring level: σ2
 . Company owners can opt for σ2
  = ∞
which amounts to choosing not to monitor the managers. The report
(2) τ(θ,e, )=θ + e +  
7is delivered once the manager has exerted her effort.
The proﬁt and the report are observable by everyone but we do not analyze explicit contracts in
what follows. In the tradition of Holmström [1982,1999] or Scharfstein and Stein [1990], we assume
that managers cannot be bound to their ﬁrms against their will ex post. This implies that any long-
term contract that would pay some type less than spot market wages in the second period is infeasible.
Of course, short term incentive contracts could serve to help align managers and ﬁrms interests, by
specifying a proﬁt-contingent wage in the ﬁrst period. Thus, in principle, managers could be induced
to act so as to maximize a weighted average of the ﬁrm’s expected proﬁts and their future compensa-
tion. However, this more general formulation leads to the same qualitative results (see Scharfstein and
Stein [1990], Prendergast and Stole [1996], as well as Breeden and Viswanathan [1998]) that obtain if
managers care only about reputation -although naturally, the inefﬁciencies are reduced. For the sake of
starkness, we leaveexpected proﬁts out of themanagerial objectivefunction. Hence, implicit incentives
are at the heart of our analysis. Managers are paid a ﬁxed wage W1 (Eθ) at the end of the ﬁrst period as
is standard in career concerns models. Since the labor market is competitive, W1 (Eθ) corresponds to
the ﬁrst-period marginal productivity of each manager. Hence, managers exert effort and choose a level
of risk solely to inﬂuence their revenues tomorrow.
I I . B .S e c o n dP e r i o d
Beliefs about managers’ talent are updated taking into account the information that accrues at the
end of the ﬁrst period, i.e. the proﬁt π1, the report τ1,t h eﬁrst-period project pi, the anticipated equi-
librium monitoring level σ2∗
  and the anticipated equilibrium effort e∗.L e t E(θ | π1,τ 1,p i,σ 2∗
  ,e ∗)
represent these updated beliefs.
Managers cannot be promoted at the beginning of the ﬁrst period because they lack experience.
8Holding their position during the ﬁrst period allows them to gain experience χ. Promoting a manager
impacts the second-period proﬁts π2 in the sense that if an a posteriori good manager is promoted,
proﬁtsareincreasedby∆whichreﬂects that she isﬁtforhernewposition. Conversely, ifanaposteriori
bad manager is promoted, second-period proﬁts are decreased by ∆. This reﬂects that promoting a
wrong person is detrimental to the ﬁrm. Let θ be the talent-related threshold above which managers are
promoted. Then,
π2 (θ,rpi,e,∆)=π1 (θ,rpi,e)+∆ if E(θ | )+χ ≥ θ, (3)
= π1 (θ,rpi,e) − ∆ if E(θ | )+χ<θ and the manager is promoted, (4)
= π1 (θ,rpi,e) if E(θ | )+χ<θ and the manager is not promoted. (5)
Equations (3) and (4) show that ﬁrms promote managers if and only if the updated beliefs regarding
their types are sufﬁciently good, that is if and only if E(θ | π1,τ 1,p i,e ∗)+χ ≥ θ. When a manager
is not promoted, the second-period ﬁrm’s accounting proﬁt π2 is given by (5). When a manager is
promoted, the second-period ﬁrm’s accounting proﬁt is given by (3).
In order to have the problem interesting, a priori good (respectively a priori bad) managers are
(respectively are not) promoted if the market keeps similar beliefs about their abilities. Besides, even









The timing of events can be summarized as follows:
First period
1. At the beginning of the ﬁrst period, existing companies hire all managers. They agree on the
ﬁxed wages to be paid at the end of the ﬁrst period.
92. Each manager chooses the risk-proﬁle of the project she undertakes (pA or pB). This choice is
observable but not contractible.
3. By incurring a cost c(σ2
 ), company owners can increase the precision of the report τ they will
receive at date 5.
4. Then, each manager chooses her level of effort e, which is not observable.
5. Proﬁts π1 are realized. The public report τ is delivered. Wages are paid.
6. Based on realized proﬁts, the observed report, the observed choice of project, the anticipated
level of effort and the anticipated monitoring level, beliefs regarding all managers are updated.
Second period
1. Either updated beliefs regarding a manager’s type are good enough and the manager is promoted
orupdated beliefs arenot high enough and the managerremains at the same level in the hierarchy.
2. Then, both kinds of managers choose to undertake either pA or pB and the level of effort they
exert.
III. ACCOUNTING PROFITS AS THE UNIQUE SOURCE OF INFORMATION
In this section, we assume that accounting proﬁts are the unique source of information that allows
the market to update beliefs. Working backward, we ﬁrst determine each kind of managers’ levels of
effort. Then, we derive the level of risk they opt for.
III.A. Managers’ Choices of Effort
10Since effort is costly, unobservable and does not increase her ﬁrst-period wage (which is already
ﬁxed at the beginning of the period), a manager exerts e solely to inﬂuence favorably the updating
process, and in turn her second-period wage. A manager is paid her marginal productivity since the
labor market is competitive. The manager’s marginal productivity corresponds to her expected ability
over all possible values for π1 including the experience she gained during the ﬁrst period, plus the
expected value of the additional revenue related to the promotion6, minus her cost of effort. Suppose
that the market anticipates the equilibrium effort e∗. The manager chooses e so as to maximize her
second period expected revenue less her ﬁrst-period effort
(6) Eπ1 [Eθ(θ | π1,p i,e
∗)] + χ +P r
¡
E(θ | π1,p i,e
∗)+χ ≥ θ
¢
× ∆ − ψ(e).




b fe(π1 | pi,e ∗)
















where f (θ,π1 | ) and b f (π1 | )=
R
f (θ,π1 | )dθ respectively denote the joint density of the talent and
the proﬁt π1, given the effort level e∗ and the type of project pi, and the marginal density of π1. Besides,
b fe denotes the derivative of the marginal distribution with respect to effort. Overall, equation (7) shows
that the manager’s marginal incentives (left-hand-side) must be equal to her marginal cost (right-hand-
side).
































 × ∆ = ψ
0 (e
∗),
We derive the ﬁrst term in the left-hand-side of equation (8) from the computation of the covariance
from equation (7). This term represents the marginal gain of effort due to the incentives related to the
accounting data π1 through the updating process. The second term indicates the marginal gain of effort
11due to the expected additional revenue ∆ the manager earns when she is promoted. A couple of results
are obtained. On the one hand, the larger this additional revenue, the more powerful these incentives:
The attractiveness of being promoted increases. On the other hand, the farther the manager’s talent
from the threshold that allows her to be promoted (i.e. the higher
¯
¯θ − (Eθ + χ)
¯
¯), the lower these
incentives. Indeed, as
¯
¯θ − (Eθ + χ)
¯
¯ increases, the impact that effort has on the probability to be
above the threshold θ decreases.
We can now determine the choice of risk a manager makes regarding the project she has under her
control during the ﬁrst period.
III.B. Managers’ Choices of Risk
Each manager chooses between the two projects, pA or pB, which differ according to their risk-
proﬁle. Since her ﬁrst-period wage W1(Eθ) is already determined, a manager opts for the project that
maximizes her second-period revenue minus the cost of effort she exerts during the ﬁrst period:
(9) Eπ1 [Eθ(θ | π1,p i,e
∗)] + χ +P r
¡
E(θ | π1,p i,e
∗)+χ ≥ θ
¢
× ∆ − ψ(e
∗ (pi)).
At the equilibrium, the market perfectly anticipates e∗ and observes the choice of project. Thus,
Eπ1 [Eθ(θ | π1,p i,e ∗)] is equal to Eπ1 [Eθ(θ | π1(e∗),p i,e ∗)]. Since the market anticipates e∗,w ec a n
apply the law of iterated expectations. Finally, the market draws the correct inference about the man-
ager’s ability from the realized ﬁrst-period output (i.e. the expectation of the conditional expectation
is equal to the non-conditional expectation Eθ
7). Therefore, a manager only considers the impact her
choice has on the probability to be promoted-, which drives the additional revenue ∆, -and on the
cost resulting from her effort. Using statistic rules (see DeGroot 1970) for computing the conditional
12expectation in the case of normal laws8, we obtain that











In other words, E(θ | π1,p i,e ∗) is centered on the non-conditional expectation Eθ and its variance is
decreasing in σ2
pi.
Depending on the managers’ type, the choice of risk-proﬁle differs. First consider the case of a
priori good managers. Two effects are at work. Equation (8) shows that effort increases when perfor-
mance becomes more informative, i.e. the variance σ2
pi decreases. Hence, effort has a greater impact
on the updated beliefs when a manager opts for project pA than when she opts for pB: σ2
pB >σ 2
pA.
Therefore, choosing the less risky project implies a higher equilibrium effort which results in a higher
cost for the manager. This is the “cost effect”. Next consider the “probability effect”. A priori good
managers are promoted provided that the updated beliefs Eθ(θ | π1,p i,e ∗) and the ex ante beliefs E
g
θ
about their talents are similar enough. Thus, these managers prefer the beliefs regarding their types not
to be modiﬁed. Hence, they want to minimize the variance of E(θ | π1,p i,e ∗). Equation (10) shows
that this induces them to favor the riskier project. The intuition is the following: If the project is very
risky, it is difﬁcult to infer from its outcome whether success is due to fortune or managerial talent,
and whether failure occurs because of bad luck or a lack of managerial skills. Hence the market cannot
update efﬁciently its a priori beliefs. Note that both the “cost effect” and the “probability effect” go
into the same direction: Opting for pB today both decreases the cost resulting from the effort incurred
by the manager at the equilibrium and maximizes the probability to be promoted tomorrow (see Figure
1).
Insert FIGURE I: A PRIORI GOOD MANAGERS here.
13Next, consider the case of a priori bad managers. The analysis regarding the “cost effect” parallels
the above one: Opting for the riskier project is less costly in terms of effort. Conversely, the analysis
regarding the probability to be promoted tomorrow is reversed. If the market still considers that the
manager is bad, the latter is not promoted. Such a manager prefers to maximize var(E(θ | π1,p i,e ∗)),
which imposes, according to equation (10), to opt for the less risky project (see Figure 2).
Insert FIGURE II: A PRIORI BAD MANAGERS here.
Here, the “cost effect” and the “probability effect” go into two opposite directions. Hence, the ﬁnal
choice of the manager depends on the attractiveness of the promotion (i.e. the size of the additional















































a priori bad managers choose the less risky project. Indeed, (11) ensures that the additional revenue
more than offsets the larger cost incurred by the manager due to her higher effort.
These results are summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 1 Suppose accounting proﬁts are the unique source of information. Then,
(i) A priori good managers choose the riskier project (pB),
(ii) A priori bad managers choose


















Equation (8) shows that two effects are at work. First, choosing the riskier project leads to lower the
14level of effort exerted. Second, the farther the manager’s talent from the threshold that allows her to
be promoted (i.e. the higher
¯
¯θ − (Eθ + χ)
¯
¯), the lower these incentives. Hence, when the distance
that separates bad and good managers to the threshold that allows them to be promoted is the same,
the former ones work more than the latter ones since they choose the less risky project (provided that
the promotion is attractive enough), whereas good managers choose the riskier project. Being talented
induces laziness which adversely impacts the proﬁts of the ﬁrm.
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depends on the distance between the second-period expected ability of a priori
bad managers Eb
θ + χ and the threshold θ above which they are promoted. When this distance is low,
a priori bad managers have a 1
2 probability to be promoted, whatever the project undertaken. Similarly,
when this distance is high, the probability to be promoted is close to zero, whatever the project carried
out. Hence, in these two occasions, the additional revenue must be very attractive to induce a priori bad










is lower when choosing pA rather







IV. MONITORING AS A SECOND SOURCE OF INFORMATION
We now investigate the case where the company owners have the opportunity to monitor10 the
manager during the ﬁrst period. Wework backward: Weﬁrst determine the managers’ choices of effort.
15Then, we investigate the company owners’ level of monitoring. Finally, we analyze the managers’
choices of risk.
IV.A. The Managers’ Choices of Effort
Suppose that the market anticipates both e∗ and the monitoring level σ2∗
 . A manager chooses e so
as to maximize her second period expected revenue less her ﬁrst-period effort
(12) Eπ1,τ
£





+ χ +P r
¡





× ∆ − ψ(e).




b fe(π1,τ | pi,σ 2∗
  ,e ∗)
b f (π1,τ | pi,σ 2∗


















The addition of a second source of information, namely the public report τ, modiﬁes the updating





































































































¯θ − (Eθ + χ)
¯
¯.W ed e r i v et h eﬁrst two terms of equation (14) from the computation of
the covariance in equation (13). Term 1 is identical to the ﬁrst term in equation (8) where accounting
proﬁts were the unique source of information. Term 2 represents the marginal increase in effort due
to the incentives created by the second source of information (i.e. the report τ) through the updating
16process. Term 3 shows the marginal increase in effort created by the additional revenue ∆ the manager
earns when she is promoted. Term 3 is larger than its corresponding term in (8). Comparing (8) and (14)
shows that when projects are risky enough the existence of the second source of information reinforces
the incentives to work.
IV.B. The Company Owners’ Monitoring Decision
By incurring a cost c(σ2
 ), the employers choose the precision of the report τ they receive. When
doing so, managers are already hired for the ﬁrst period. This implies that employers choose the level
of monitoring that maximizes the ﬁrms’ ﬁrst-period expected net proﬁts:
σ
2∗























where c0 corresponds to the derivative of the cost function with respect to σ2
 , and e∗ is the manager’s
optimal choice of effort.





















































Term A shows the impact of monitoring on the marginal incentives to exert effort created by the second
source of information, that is, the marginal increase of Term 2 (see (14)) when σ2
  decreases. Term B
17represents the impact of monitoring on the marginal incentives to exert effort created by the additional
revenue ∆, that is, the marginal increase in Term 3 when σ2
  decreases. Overall, the left-hand side of
(16) represents the marginal gain of monitoring for the company owners. At the equilibrium, this gain
just offsets the monitoring marginal cost −c0 (σ2
 )11.
When projects are risky enough, the marginal gain of monitoring is higher when a manager has
chosen the riskier project (pB) than when she has chosen the less risky project (pA). Since the marginal
cost of monitoring does not depend on the risk of the project undertaken (σ2
pi), we obtain the next
proposition.
Proposition 3 For a given manager, company owners exert a higher monitoring level if this manager
has opted for the riskier project (pB) rather than for the less risky project (pA).
Finally, we determine the choice of risk by the managers.
IV.C. Managers’ Choices of Risk
The managers, whatever their type, anticipate that the observable choice of risk they make will
induce company owners to perform an adequate level of monitoring.
As when accounting proﬁts are the sole source of information, a priori bad managers balance the
“cost effect” and the “probability effect” when considering the choice of project. What differs here is
thatboththe“probabilityeffect”andthe“costeffect”consistofadirectaswellasanindirecteffect. The
direct “probability effect” results from the shift from pB to pA on the probability of promotion. This
effect is positive since pB is sufﬁciently risky to impede the updating of beliefs process whereas pA
exhibits a sufﬁciently low enough level of risk to facilitate the updating of beliefs process. The indirect
“probability effect” corresponds to the positive effect of monitoring on the probability of promotion,
times the negative impact of a shift from pB to pA on the equilibrium level of monitoring. Note that
18monitoring decreases because its marginal gain (i.e. the increase in managerial effort) is higher when
project pB is chosen than when project pA is chosen, whereas its marginal cost does not depend on
the risk of the project. Hence, this indirect effect is negative. However, it does not offset the positive
direct effect if the marginal cost of monitoring is sufﬁciently increasing to avoid a large difference








To summarize, opting for pA rather than pB increases the probability to be promoted for a priori bad
managers.
Next, turn to the “cost effect” which also consists of a direct as well as an indirect effect. On the
one hand, opting for the less risky project increases the equilibrium level of effort which raises the
cost incurred by a priori bad managers (direct effect). On the other hand, opting for the less risky
project decreases the level of monitoring while monitoring increases the equilibrium level of effort.
Thus, the indirect effect is positive for a priori bad managers. However, it does not offset the negative
impact of a shift from pB to pA on the cost resulting from e∗ when the marginal cost of monitoring
is sufﬁciently increasing to avoid a large difference between monitoring levels depending on pA or pB







high enough). To summarize, a priori bad managers increase their
cost of effort when they opt for pA rather than pB.
Hence, the “cost effect” and the “probability effect” go into two opposite directions. Thus, a priori
bad managers face a trade-off between increasing the probability to be promoted and reducing the cost
of effort they incur. Overall, they opt for the less risky project when the promotion is sufﬁciently



































































































Now consider a priori good managers. For the “cost effect” as well as for the “probability effect”,
the indirect effect is dominated by the direct effect under the same conditions as above. Both the “cost
effect” and the “probability effect” induce a priori good managers to opt for the riskier project (pB)a s
when accounting proﬁts are the sole source of information.
For a given manager, undertaking a more risky project raises the company owners monitoring ac-












monitor more intensely a priori good managers than a priori bad managers. These results are summa-
rized in the following proposition.








(i) A priori good managers opt for the riskier project (pB),

















¯. Then, company owners monitor more intensely a priori
good managers than a priori bad managers.
IV.D Related literature
Our paper is most closely related to DeMarzo and Dufﬁe [1995], Breeden and Viswanathan [1998],
and Hermalin [1993]. This connection deserves some comments.
20When the managers privately know their respective type while their policy with respect to risk
(through hedging) is not observable, good managers want the market to learn information regarding
their talent. Hence, they hedge because hedging ameliorates the accuracy of the information con-
tained by corporate proﬁts regarding their ability as it eliminates extraneous noise. Conversely, bad
managers do not want the market to learn information. Accordingly, they do not hedge [Breeden and
Viswanathan12 , 1998]. In our model, all the existing information is already available to the market.
Then, a priori good managers try to impede the learning process since they favor the statu quo while
a priori bad managers want to facilitate this process since they want the market to modify its beliefs.
This is possible since the risk-taking policy is observable.
Now consider the case where managers do not have privileged information regarding their talent
and are risk-averse in the sense that they fear to have their wages reassessed. Whatever their talent, if
their policy with respect to risk (either through a choice of project or through hedging) is observable,
they have an incentiveto impedethe updating of beliefs process. This can take the form ofa no-hedging
policy [DeMarzo and Dufﬁe, 1995] or a high-risk-taking policy [Hermalin, 1993]. We show that this
motive still holds for the risk-neutral managers we consider provided they are a priori of the good type.
However, a priori bad risk-neutral managers opts for the less risky projects to facilitate the learning
process since the statu quo is detrimental to them.
Moreover what also differentiates our research from the above papers is that we analyze the impact
of the risk-taking policy on the incentives to exert effort. Speciﬁcally, we show that because a priori
good managers impede the learning process by favoring risk, this induces them to lower the level of
effort they exert. Hence, the mechanism through which theproﬁtabilityofﬁr m sisa d v e rs el yim p a ct edi s
differentfrom whatHermalinconsiders: Hesimplyassumesthatthemanagersand thecompany owners
interests about the risk-taking policy may not be aligned, while we show that risk-taking indirectly
21decreases proﬁtability.
Finally, we investigate how company owners increase monitoring when a priori good managers
try to impede the updating process. This second source of information is absent in the three papers
analyzed above.
IV.E Implications
The framework we develop here allows for many contexts and sources of information. Consider the
case of an engineer working in a R&D department and on the eve of being promoted. In order to keep
her good reputation, she undertakes very risky projects. In such a case, her supervisor’s reaction could
be to adjust the number of engineers she has under her control since this would alter the accuracy of the
assessment of their individual inputs. General partners periodically seek funds from limited partners to
set up new venture capital funds. Well-established general partners are able to obtain better conditions
than newcomers in the industry. Setting up a new fund thus implies a substantial increase in revenue
for the general partners. To prevent the market from updating its beliefs regarding their types, they can
increase the risk of the projects the current fund they manage invests in: For example, they select a high
proportion of early-stage ventures they allocate funds to. The limited partners reaction is to bargain for
more seats on the advisory board so as to better monitor the investments or to resort to gatekeepers.
In the same vein, a divisional manager may beneﬁt from launching ambitious programs of investment
(more perks and fame associated to the increase of the size of the division). So as to keep her good
reputation, shecan undertakevery riskyventures beforetheheadquarters makestheexpansion decision.
The latter can obtain more accurate and non-manipulable information by carving out the division.
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS
22In this paper, we show that the perspective of a promotion may not discipline managers that have
a good reputation to keep. We also examine a possible reaction of their current employers: Resorting
to a source of information the precision of which is not manipulable by the managers to facilitate the
updating of beliefs process that good managers try to render difﬁcult by undertaking risky projects.
We focus on implicit incentives and leave aside explicit devices. It would be worth extending
the idea developed in the present paper to the context of risk aversion where implicit incentives are
necessary to complement explicit mechanisms, particularly for managers who are at the beginning of
their careers. Our results should be robust to such an extension.
23APPENDIX
A. PR O F I T SA ST H EU N I Q U ES O U R C EO FI N F O R M A T I O N:P ROOF OF PROPOSITION 1 AND
PROPOSITION 2
First, we determine the choice of effort by the managers.
A.1 Choice of effort by the managers in the ﬁrst period
Suppose that the market anticipates the equilibrium effort e∗. The manager chooses e so as to
maximize
(17) Eπ1 [Eθ(θ | π1,p i,e
∗)] + χ +P r
¡





π1 = θ + rpi + e.





f (θ,π1 | pi,e ∗)
b f (π1 | pi,e ∗)
dθ
!
db F (π1 | pi,e)+P r
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b fe(π1 | pi,e ∗)
b f (π1 | pi,e ∗)












(19) b f (π1 | )=
Z
f (π1,θ| )dθ
and f (π1,θ| ) denote respectively the marginal density of the observables and the joint density of the
talent and of the observables, given the equilibrium level of effort e∗ and the choice of project pi. b fe
denotes the derivative of the marginal distribution with respect to effort.










b fe(π1 | pi,e ∗)
b f (π1 | pi,e ∗)













































a conditional expectation in the case of normal laws gives











E(θ | π1,p i,e
∗)+χ ≥ θ
¢






































































































A.2 Choice of risk by the managers in the ﬁrst-period
Managers choose pi so as to maximize
(25) Eπ1 [Eθ(θ | π1,p i,e
∗)] + χ +P r
¡
E(θ | π1,p i,e
∗)+χ ≥ θ
¢
× ∆ − ψ(e
∗ (pi)).
According to equation (25), managers ground their risk decision by considering the cost of effort im-
plied by the project and the probability to be promoted. They leave aside Eπ1 [Eθ(θ | π1,p i,e ∗)] since
at the equilibrium, the market perfectly anticipates e∗ and observes the choice of project. Thus,
Eπ1 [Eθ(θ | π1,p i,e
∗)] = Eπ1 [Eθ(θ | π1(e
∗),p i,e
∗)] = Eθ.
Consider a priori good managers. First, it appears from (24) that minimizing the cost of effort
implies to maximize σ2
pi. Next, let us examine the probability of promotion: Using statistic rules for
computing conditional expectations in the case of normal laws (see DeGroot 1970), we obtain E(θ |









. It indicates that raising σ2
pi decreases the variance of E(θ | π1,p i,e ∗)
and in turn maximizes the probability to be above the threshold θ. Indeed, E
g
θ +χ ≥ θ. Hence, overall,
an a priori good manager opts for, pB, the more risky project.
Now consider bad managers. Their situation is different. Since Eb
θ + χ<θ, they maximize the
probability of promotion when minimizing σ2
pi. However, minimizing σ2
pi implies a higher cost of







































































B. THE REPORT AS A SECOND SOURCE OF INFORMATION:P ROOFS OF PROPOSITION 3 AND
PROPOSITION 4
B . 1C h o i c eo fe f f o r tb yt h em a n a g e r si nt h eﬁrst period
First, let us determine the equilibrium effort e∗. Suppose that the market anticipates both e∗ and the
monitoring level σ2∗
 . The manager chooses e so as to maximize
Eπ1,τ
£





+ χ +P r
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f (θ,π1,τ | pi,σ 2∗
  ,e ∗)
b f (π1,τ | pi,σ 2∗
  ,e ∗)
dθ
!
db F (π1,τ | pi,σ 2∗
  ,e)+P r
¡
E(θ | π1,τ,p i,σ 2∗

















b fe (π1,τ | pi,σ2∗
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b f (π1,τ | pi,σ 2∗
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b fe (π1,τ | pi,σ2∗
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27Note that (π1,τ | pi,σ 2∗
  ,e ∗) follows a normal law, because all the linear compositions of the elements
of π1 and τ (i.e. θ,rpi, ) are normal since θ,rpi, and   are independent normal variables. Using

























































(τ − E(τ | π1,p i,σ 2∗
 ,e ∗))
2







τ − E(τ | π1,p i,σ 2∗
  ,e ∗)
Va r(τ | π1,p i,σ2∗
 ,e ∗)
. (31)
Applying statistic rules for computing expectations and variances in the case of normal laws, we obtain
E
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(π1 − E(π1)) and
Va r
¡















































Now turn to the second part in the left-hand-side of equation (28). Applying statistic rules for
computing a conditional expectation in the case of normal laws gives












































E(θ | π1,τ,p i,σ 2∗
















































Thus, the second part in the left-hand side of equation (28) can be rewritten as
∂ Pr
¡
E(θ | π1,τ,p i,σ2∗









































































































































































































































+ v(.) × ∆.
B.2 Choice of monitoring by company owners
Based on the observed project pi, company owners choose the level of monitoring that maximizes
the ﬁrm’s ﬁrst-period expected net proﬁts:
(36) σ
2∗



















































































where ψ0−1 is the reciprocal function of ψ0. The left-hand side of (38) represents the marginal gain
when there is more monitoring: When σ2
  decreases, the equilibrium level of effort e∗ increases. The
right-hand side of equation (38) corresponds to the marginal cost when there is more monitoring: When
σ2
  decreases, c(σ2
 ) increases.
According to the left-hand side of (38), ∂e∗
∂σ2
  is positive when σ2











  is strictly positive if σ2
pi is high enough. This implies that company owners exert a strictly
positive monitoring effort.
Note that it may be the case that ∂e∗
∂σ2
  is negative when σ2
pA is low enough and (Eθ + χ) takes
intermediate values with respect to the threshold θ (see (35)). Then, more monitoring implies less
effort at the equilibrium. Since monitoring is costly, it is not valuable for corporate owners. Then, the
latter only use accounting proﬁts for updating beliefs about managers.
Let us consider the impact of a shift from pB to pA on the monitoring level. Consider the marginal
































































































































































































pB high enough and σ2























2 < 0 since
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ψ































if and only if σ2
pB is high enough and σ2
pA is low enough. To summarize, under the conditions that
σ2
pB is high enough and σ2





pA, whereas the marginal cost of monitoring, −c0 (σ2
 ), does not depend on σ2
pi.
Therefore, the level of monitoring chosen by the corporate owners is higher when a manager chooses
pB rather than pA.
31B.3 Choice of risk by the managers in the ﬁrst period
When choosing a project or equivalently a level of risk, managers take two elements into account:
The cost of effort and the probability to be promoted.
B.3.1 A priori bad managers
First, consider a priori bad managers.
Probability of promotion
Let us ﬁrst consider the total effect of a shift from project pB to project pA on the probability to be
promoted at e = e∗. For a given level of monitoring chosen by company owners σ2
 , this probability is
Pr
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Two effects are at work.































. Note that for σ2
pB high enough and σ2
pA low











































< 1 − Φ
¡¡













Thus, the direct effect is positive for a priori bad managers.
The indirect effect corresponds to the impact of a shift from pB to pA on the equilibrium level of
monitoring σ2∗
  , times the effect of the level of monitoring on this probability. Assuming that σ2
pi is
32high enough ensures that
∂ Pr
¡
E(θ | π1,τ,p i,σ2



























































































sinceEθ+χ<θ. Hence, moremonitoringraises theprobabilityofpromotionforaprioribadmanagers.
Besides, the level of monitoring chosen by corporate owners decreases when a manager chooses pA
rather than pB (see B.2) when σ2
pB is high enough and σ2
pA is low enough. Therefore, the indirect effect
is negative for a priori bad managers.
Hence, the direct and the indirect effect go into two opposite directions. However, if c000 (σ2
 ) is







is high enough, the difference in terms of monitoring between project pA












) and the indirect effect is low. Thus, the total effect
of a shift from pB topA on the probability to be promoted ate = e∗ ispositive for a priori badmanagers.
However, this also implies a variation in the equilibrium level of effort e∗ we now investigate.
Cost of effort
Let us examine the total effect of a shift from pB to pA on e∗. This total effect consists of a direct
effect (i.e. the effect of σ2
pi on e∗), as well as of an indirect effect (i.e. the effect of σ2
pi on σ2∗
 , times the
effect of σ2
  on e∗).
First consider the direct effect, that is, for a given σ2





























i fa n do n l yi fσ2
pB is high enough and σ2
pA is low enough. Note that (ψ0−1)00 (j (.)) < 0 if ψ000(e) > 0.
33Thus, the direct effect on the equilibrium cost of effort is negative: For a given σ2
 , e∗ increases when
a manager chooses pA rather than pB.
Next turn to theindirect effect. As shown above, monitoring increases the equilibrium level ofeffort
e∗. Besides, the level of monitoring chosen by corporate owners decreases when managers choose pA
rather than pB under the sufﬁcient conditions that σ2
pB is high enough and σ2
pA is low enough. Thus,
the indirect effect of a shift to the less risky project on the cost incurred by a priori bad managers is
positive.
Insert FIGURE III: ILLUSTTRATION, here.
Hence, the direct and the indirect effect go into two opposite directions. However, if c000 (σ2
 ) is







is high enough, the difference in terms of monitoring between project pB












) and the indirect effect is low. Then, the total
effect of a shift from pB to pA on the equilibrium cost of effort is negative.
Conclusion
A priori bad managers face a trade-off between increasing the probability to be promoted or reduc-
ing the cost of effort when they choose the ﬁrst-period project. Overall, a priori bad managers choose





E(θ | π1,τ,p A,σ 2∗
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B.3.2 A priori good managers
Next, turn to a priori good managers. Assume that c000 (σ2










pA islowenough. Minimizingthecost ofeffort implies tomaximizeσ2
pi. Maximizing
the probability of promotion imposes to raise σ2
pi. Hence, overall, an a priori good manager opts for
pB,t h em o r er i s k yp r o j e c t .
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37NOTES
1. For a general discussion on career concerns models, we shall refer the reader to Dewatripont,
Jewitt and Tirole [1999, part I], who develop a general model of career concerns with multiple tasks
and multiple signals.
2. See also Hermalin [1993] who presents a theoretical model of choice of risk by risk-averse
managers in a career concerns setting. DeMarzo and Dufﬁe [1995] develop a model of hedging in the
same vein.
3. The choice of risk can also be interpreted as a choice of hedging policy. Generally Accepted
Accounting Procedures do not impose on those who run ﬁrms (i.e. managers) to disclose their hedging
decisions. However, company owners have privileged information regarding these hedging policies:
They observe the choices managers make but are unable to write contracts contingent on this soft
information.
4. Biais and Casamatta [1999] in the spirit of Jensen (1986) also study the case of managers exerting
effort and choosing the risk of their ventures. However, both choices are unobservable in their paper
whichdiffersfromourassumptionthatthechoiceofriskisobservable. Moreover, theyexamineexplicit
incentives whereas we consider implicit incentives.
5. Pr
¡
E(θ | )+χ ≥ θ
¢
is the probability that the random variable E(θ | ) plus the term χ is higher
than the threshold θ.
6. Note that even if the choice of risk was not observable, at the equilibrium, the market would per-
fectly anticipate it so that Eπ1 [Eθ(θ | π1,p ∗,e ∗)] = Eπ1 [Eθ(θ | π1(p∗,e ∗),p ∗,e ∗)] = Eθ would obtain.
387. Applying statistic rules for computing conditional expectations in the case of normal laws gives
















8. Φ() is the cumulative distribution of N (0,1).
9. Several monitoring technologies are available. In our companion paper, we investigate the role
of ﬁnancial markets monitoring as a second source of information.
10. We refer the reader to the Appendix, proof of Proposition 3, for a discussion of the solution
given by equation (16) as the global solution to the company owners’ choice of monitoring.
11. The proof regarding the strict concavity of the objective function is available on request to the
authors. It is derived from characteristics of the cost function c, i.e. strict convexity and c00(σ2
ω) high
enough.
12. As for managers lying in the intermediate ability-range, the results are mixed. Besides, Breeden
and Viswanathan show that there exists a non-intuitive equilibrium where good managers decide not to
hedge
39g Eθ θ
: Density function of the riskier version of the project: Type 2
: Density function of the less risky version of the project: Type 1
: Difference of probability when choosing Type 2 rather than Type 1
FIGURE I:: A PRIORI GOOD MANAGERS
40θ
: Density function of the riskier version of the project: Type 2
: Density function of the less risky version of the project: Type 1
: Difference of probability when choosing Type  1 rather than Type 2
b Eθ
FIGURE II: A PRIORI BAD MANAGERS
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